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COMMENTS
FEDERAL TAX EFFECTS OF THE PARENTAL
OBLIGATION OF SUPPORT IN LOUISIANA
The incidence of federal taxation is not based solely on the
form of transactions, but relies also on their underlying economic
reality. This is illustrated by the tax treatment of the benefit
accruing to the taxpayer when any of his legal obligations,
including his obligation to support his children, is discharged
by a trust he created or controls. This results in an economic
benefit to the taxpayer that should be taxed to him. The Income
Tax Regulations provide that the discharge of his parental
support obligation will have this effect "if, and only if, the
obligation is not affected by the adequacy of the dependent's
own resources."' This Comment will explore the application of
this formula to the Louisiana law of support and the resulting
consequences in income, gift, and estate taxation.2
INCOME TAX
Trusts
Generally, income from trust property is taxed to the
trust if it is accumulated, or to the beneficiary if it is distributed.3
However, in some instances the income of a trust is taxed to
the person who has economic control over the trust or who
derives economic benefit from it. Thus, trust income may be
taxed to the grantor,4 or to a person who possesses certain powers
over the trust, or to a person whose obligations are discharged
by it.6 Section 677(a) states the general rule that the grantor
shall be treated, and hence taxed, as owner of a trust to the
extent that the income may be distributed to the grantor or
applied for his benefit. Relying on this section the Supreme
Court in Helvering v. Stuart" held that income of a trust avail-
able for the discharge of the grantor's parental obligation is
taxable to him, notwithstanding that the income is not used for
that purpose.
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956).
2. The tax treatment of alimony, and separate maintenance payments
under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71, 215, 682, is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
3. Id. § 662.
4. Id. § 677.
5. Id. § 678.
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956).
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 167, 53 Stat. 47, now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 677(a).
8. 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
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Congress, disapproving 9 the interpretation of the Court in
Stuart, amended the Code to restore the prior administrative
practice 0 and jurisprudence" with respect to support trusts.
This amendment, now section 677 (b) of the 1954 Code, provides:
"Income of a trust shall not be considered taxable to the
grantor . ..merely because such income in the discretion
of another person, the trustee, or the grantor acting as trustee
or co-trustee, may be applied or distributed for the support
or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally
obligated to support or maintain except to the extent that
such income is so applied or distributed .... ,,12
The amendment is considered by the courts as an exception
to be interpreted strictly.13 Consequently, when the income of
a trust may be used for the grantor's benefit in a manner not
contemplated by the terms of section 677(b), the income will
be taxed as set forth in section 677 (a), and all income usable
for support will be taxed to the parent-grantor.
The cases falling outside the exception provided by section
677 (b) may be divided into three groups. The first is where the
income from the trust may be used to satisfy a personal obliga-
tion that is support related. 14 A recent example of this is the
trust considered in Morrill v. United States. 5 The taxpayer set
up trusts for the education of his children. The private schools
in which they were enrolled looked to the father for the payment
of tuition and other expenses but these were in fact paid by the
trustee. The court found that the taxpayer was personally liable
to the schools and, therefore, payment to them discharged the
grantor's obligation. Since this was not a support obligation, the
grantor was taxed on the entire income of the trust. If, how-
ever, the schools had contracted directly with the trustee and
looked solely to him for payment, only that portion of the trust
income actually applied to support would have been taxable
to the grantor. 16
9. H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 50.
10. G.C.M. 18972, 1937-2 CuM. BULL. 231.
11. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935); Commissioner v. Grosvenor, 85
F.2d (2d Cir. 1936).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 677(b).
13. Estate of Hamiel v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1958);
Hopkins v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1944).
14. The Regulations cite as examples the payment of the grantor's rent
or other household expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.677(b)-l(d) (1956).
15. 228 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Me. 1964).
16. Collins, How to Avoid Tax Traps Arising from Retention and Exces-
sive Control by Grantor, 27 J. TAXATION 356 (1967).
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The grantor will also be treated as owner of a trust when
he has discretion to distribute income and his discretion is not
limited by a fiduciary duty.17 Even where the grantor is a named
trustee, the court will find his powers retained in a capacity
other than as trustee when he has been relieved of his fiduciary
duty.'8 Finally, when the terms of the trust require income to
be applied to the support of the dependent, the so-called man-
datory support trust, the Stuart doctrine will apply because the
trustee has no discretion over the distribution of income.19 In
all three of these cases, the grantor has retained control or
enjoyment of the trust beyond the requirements of the excep-
tion and is, therefore, treated as owner.
The parent may be taxed as owner of a trust under section
678, although he is not the grantor. This section provides that
a person other than the grantor is taxed on income of a trust to
the extent that he can vest the corpus or income in himself.
However, there is an exception, strictly interpreted,2 0 taxing
income usable for support to such a person only to the extent
it is actually so applied.21 The application of section 678 will
usually arise in the so-called "grandfather trusts," in which a
grandfather creates a trust for the support of his grandchildren
and appoints their father trustee. The grandfather will not be
taxed under section 677 because his obligation to support depends
on the adequacy of the minor's resources~n and is, therefore,
without tax effect.28 However the father as trustee will be taxed
on that part of the income used for support.
24
The most general basis upon which the parent may be taxed
is as a beneficiary. Regulation 1.662 (a) -4 provides: "Any amount
which, pursuant to the terms of a will or trust instrument, is
used in full or partial discharge of a legal obligation of support
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.677(b)-l(e) (1956).
18. In Hopkins v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1944), where
the grantor, who was also a co-trustee, retained the power to, in his sole
discretion, require either the income or corpus of the trust to be expended
for the best interest of his son, and was relieved of liability except for fraud
or bad faith, the grantor was held not to be acting as trustee as that word
is used in the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 167(c), 53 Stat. 47, now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 677(b).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.677(b)-1(f) (1956).
20. Id. § 1.678(c)-1(b).
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 678(c).
22. See note 109 infra, and accompanying text.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956).
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 678(c); Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d 1
(8th Cir. 1945). See also Sarles, Tax Consequences of "Grandlather" Trusts,
1959 So. CAL TAX. INST. 675.
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is included in the gross income of such person .... ,,25 This
regulation treats the parent as beneficiary and taxes him on
the trust income even though he is neither the grantor of the
trust nor a fiduciary with respect to it. It has been criticized2 6
because it taxes the parent on income applied to meet his
support obligation even though he has no power 27 over such
application. Its rationale is based on the economic benefit theory,
but its validity has not yet been tested in the courts.28
Writers2 have suggested that taxation of the trust income
to the trust may be accomplished, and hence taxation to the
father avoided, by the accumulation of income in a trust with
a provision for distribution of it to the minor beneficiary with-
out restriction when he reaches a certain age or at the termina-
tion of the trust.80 Then the minor could use the previously
accumulated income as his own funds to provide a large support
item such as college education. This result can be aided further
by avoiding any mention of support, maintenance, or education
in the trust instrument.
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act
The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, enacted in Louisiana8 1
in 1958, provides that the custodian of the minor's property
shall have the discretionary power to apply all or a part of
its income for "the support maintenance, education and general
use and benefit of the minor."8 2 In view of this power, the
Commissioner held in Revenue Ruling 56-48433 that, regardless
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956).
26. Mannheimer, Sprinkling Trusts, 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 919 (1956);
Winton, Taxation of Nongrantors under Trusts for Support of Their Do-
pendents, 33 TAXES 804 (1955).
27. Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1945): "It seems to
us, as it did to a majority of the Tax Court, that it is the possession of
power over the disposition of trust income which is of significance in deter-
mining whether, under section 22(a) [definition of gross income], the income
is taxable to the possessor of such power."
28. Ehrlich, The Effective Use of Support Trusts: Trusts for Minors,
Custodian Statutes, Gifts of Future Interests, 19TH N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX.
729 (1961).
29. Kirby, Current Developments in Use of Trusts in Income and
Estate Planning, 1959 So. CALIF. TAX INST. 627, 653; Miller, Appropriate
Forms of Gifts to Minors, 16TH N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 765, 770 (1958).
30. Such distributions would avoid the effect of the five-year throwback
rule. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 665(b). Greater savings could be achieved
by distributing part of the income currently to the minor and retaining
the rest. In this way full use is made of both tax entities, the trust, and
the minor.
31. LA. R.S. 9:735-742 (1958).
32. Id. 9:738.
33. 1956 Cum. BULL. 23.
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of the relationship of the donor or of the custodian to the
donee, income derived from property transferred under the Act84
is includable in the income of the person obligated to support
the minor to the extent that the income is used in discharge of
the obligation. The ruling was issued under section 61 of the
Code, which defines gross income, and, it is, therefore, based on
the economic benefit theory. As noted above,8 5 this basis is
questionable when an independent custodian is appointed, and
the father neither provides the property nor retains any power
over the application of the funds for support.86
Outright Gifts
This device offers the additional burden to the parent of
proving the transfer was an economic reality.87 This may be
difficult as the courts scrutinize family transactions closely.88
In addition, the Service's position in this area, as set forth in
Regulation 1.662 (a) -4 and Revenue Ruling 56-484, will probably
result in an attempt to impute income from the donated property
to the parent when it is used for support. The economic benefit
theory, implicit in the regulation and ruling, would require
taxing any income used for the support of his child to the
father.89
GIFT TAX
To the extent a parent is satisfying his support obligation
in making a transfer for the benefit of his minor child, he is
not making a gift.40 Where the transfer discharges his support
obligation in full, the Commissioner has held that there is an
adequate consideration in money or money's worth 41 and, there-
fore, such a transfer is beyond the reach of the gift tax. Also,
34. Even though Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 23, applied only to
the Model Gifts of Securities to Minors Act, the Commissioner in Rev. Rul.
59-357, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 212 held that the variations between the Model Act
and the Uniform Act would produce no different tax effects, and that prior
rulings on the Model Act applied to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.
35. See note 27 supra, and accompanying text.
36. See CCH 1968 STAND. FED. TAX REP. f 303.467, at 9543.
37. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935); Henry D. Duarte, 44 T.C. 193 (1965); cf. Prudence Miller
Trust, 7 T.C. 1245 (1946); Rev. Rul. 55-469, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 519.
38. Schoenberg v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1962); Wodehouse
v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1949).
39. See CCH 1968 STAND. FED. TAX REP. g 303.467, at 9543.
40. For an excellent discussion of the policies in this area, see Note, 74
HARv. L. REV. 1191 (1961).
41. E.T. 19, 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 166.
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as to continuing expenditures for support, such as education, a
gift tax should not be due unless they are clearly in excess of
the obligation.4
The problem is complicated where the support obligation is
not completely discharged by the transfer. In cases of mandatory
support trusts, it is arguable that the transfer is for the benefit
of the donor, and thus, a gift has not been made. Here the tax-
payer could urge the economic benefit theory48 used by the Com-
missioner in the income tax area.44 When a discretionary sup-
port trust is involved, the entire transfer will probably be taxed,
because the portion of the income that will be used for support
cannot be determined in advance. The Commissioner has ruled
that transfers under the gifts-to-minors statute are taxable gifts
whether or not they are used for support.45
ESTATE TAX
The support obligation may also affect the determination
of what property is included in the gross estate of a decedent46
under section 2036 (a) (1).47 This section reaches property of
which the decedent retained the possession, enjoyment, or right
to income. When the income from transferred property is to
be applied to the support obligation of the donor, he has retained
a right to income over such property." There are three require-
ments before the section becomes operative: (1) there must
be a transfer by the decedent during life for less than adequate
42. The majority of these cases of course would fall within the $3,000
annual exclusion anyway. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
43. See note 28 supra, and accompanying text.
44. However, it is well settled that the income and gift tax do not
necessarily form an integrated pattern of taxation. See, e.g., Commissioner
v. Prouty, 115 F.2d 331, 337 (1st Cir. 1940); Whayne v. Glenn, 59 F. Supp.
517 (W.D. Ky. 1945).
45. Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 449. Here also the amount that
will be used for support cannot be determined in advance.
46. As this Comment deals only with the tax effect of the support
obligation, only § 2036(a)(1) dealing with retained life estates is pertinent.
Other sections, such as HI 2036(a)(2), 2038, 2041 may require inclusion of
the transferred property due to a power retained by the parent, but they
are beyond the scope of this discussion.
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a): "GENEAL RULE-The value of the
gross estate shall include the value of all the property to the extent of any
interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer
(except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference
to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession of enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or .... "
48. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (1960).
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consideration; (2) the decedent must have retained the posses-
sion, enjoyment, or right to income of such property; and (3)
the retention must have been for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
that does not in fact end before his death.49
The first and third of these quickly eliminate many cases
involving support. Under the first requirement, the support
obligor who had retained enjoyment must have made the transfer
for less than an adequate consideration. Hence, a grandfather's
transfer would not be included in his estate because of the sub-
sidiary nature of his obligation,5 nor would it be included in
the estate of the father because he is not the transferor.6 1 This
requirement also excludes property transferred by the parent in
consideration of the relinquishment of his support obligation.
A complete discharge of the duty to support minor children 52
is considered an adequate consideration in money or money's
worth; 53 therefore, the transferred property is excluded from
the operation of the statute. Under the third requirement, the
"period test," the obligor must die while the obligation is still
in force; otherwise, the transfer would be for a period that does
in fact end before his death.5 4
The second requirement, retention of possession, enjoyment,
or the right to income of the property, may create more prob-
lems. The Regulations provide that such enjoyment has been
retained to the extent income "is to be applied" toward the
discharge of a legal obligation including the obligation of sup-
port.55 The words "to be applied" imply that taxability is based
on the intention of the decedent in making the transfer. 6 Under
this test a mandatory support trust is includable in the gross
49. 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 24.06
(1959).
50. See note 109 infra, and accompanying text.
51. Estate of Chrysler v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
52. As to the possibility of completely discharging the obligation to
support a minor In Louisiana, see note 96 infra, and accompanying text.
53. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955); Hel-
vering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940); Estate of
Robert M. McKeon, 25 T.C. 697 (1956).
54. In Estate of Robert M. McKeon, 25 T.C. 697, 704 (1956), the court
makes it clear that the fact the decedent Intended the reservation of income
should end before his death is irrelevant. See also Helvering v. Mercantile-
Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 111 F.2d 224, 226 (8th Cir. 1940); Estate v.
Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503, 507 (1947).
55. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (1960).
56. 3 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIIP AND ESTATE TAXATION § 24.11 (1959).
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estate5 7 since, where income is required to be used for support,
the grantor intended such use. However, where the trustee is
granted uncontrolled discretion in applying income, the grantor
intends not to require its use for support and the courts have
generally refused to include the property in the estate, even
though part of the income has in the past been used for support. 58
The effect of section 2036(a) (1) on transfers under the
Model or Uniform Gifts to Minors Act 59 was considered by the
Tax Court in Estate of Jack F. Chrysler." The court held that
where the father-donor appointed himself custodian under the
act, the property transferred to his children would be included
in his gross estate at his death because he could apply the income
to their support and thus satisfy his own support obligation.
Hence, he had in effect retained the enjoyment of the property.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed on other grounds and
failed to decide this issue.6 '
THE OBLIGATION OF SUPPORT
Federal Requirements
Throughout the Regulations and Revenue Rulings the sup-
port obligation is referred to as the "legal obligation of support.
62
This phrase implies an obligation that is not voluntary but
required by law. Since there is no federal law of support,63 the
obligation must be founded on state law. The term "legal obliga-
tion of support" is defined in the regulations relating to income
tax, which provide:
57. Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1953); Hel-
vering v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 111 F.2d 224 (8th Cir.
1940); Estate v. William H. Lee, 33 T.C. 1064 (1960).
58. Commissioner v. Douglas's Estate, 143 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1944): "There
is certainly an important difference of fact between the trust set up for
the very purpose of providing for the settlor's legal obligation to his wife
and the one in which disinterested trustees have an option to apply a portion
of the income for the support of the settlor's minor child." See also Estate
of Jack F. Chrysler, 44 T.C. 55 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 361 F.2d 508
(2d Cir. 1966).
59. The tax consequences under both acts are the same. See Rev. Rul.
59-357, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 212.
60. Estate v. Jack F. Chrysler, 44 T.C. 55 (1965), rev'd on other grounds,
361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
61. Estate of Chrysler v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
62. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.667(b)(1), (1956), 1.678(c)-i (1956), 20.2036-
1(b)(2) (1960).
63. The great number of cases and rulings handed down under § 151 of
the Code could be used as a basis for a support standard, but as of yet
neither the Commissioner nor the courts have seen fit to refer to them when
handling problems in this area.
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"The term legal obligation includes a legal obligation to
support another person if, and only if, the obligation is not
affected by the adequacy of the dependents' own resources.
• * , In any event, the amount of the trust income which is
included in the gross income of a person obligated to sup-
port a dependent is limited by the extent of his legal obliga-
tion under local law.16 4
Revenue Ruling 56-484,65 dealing with gifts-to-minors acts, makes
it clear that the income imputed to the parent is limited by the
extent of his legal obligations under local law.
These statements by the Service imply a consistent position.
However, a different interpretation may be advanced. 66 It could
be argued that Regulation 1.662 (a) -4 applies to the situation
envisioned in Code section 662, in which the parent is neither
grantor nor fiduciary of the trust. If he is either settlor or trustee,
that Regulation would not apply and taxation to the parent would
rest solely on an interpretation of sections 677 (b) and 678 (c)
and the Regulations. A reasonable interpretation of the wording
of the statute, "applied or distributed for the support or main-
tenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obligated
to support or maintain,' 67 seems to require the imputation of all
amounts expended for a beneficiary whom the grantor or holder
of a power is obligated to support. Under this approach, state
law would be used to determine the existence of the obligation
and its nature as primary or secondary. Therefore, the Commis-
sioner would not be bound by state law as to the extent of the
obligation and could tax to the parent all of the money spent
on the minor even when it exceeded that obligation.
A reading of the cases does not support this theory. The
courts definitely look to state law to determine not only the
existence of the obligation,68 but also its extent. 9 However, local
law has not restricted the Commissioner from taxing to the
parent all income distributed for the benefit of his child as
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956).
65. 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 23.
66. Samuels, Beware of Trusts for Dependents, 37 TAXES 109 (1959).
67. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 677(b). Similar wording is found in the sec-
tion dealing with a power in the person owing the obligation. See id. §
678(c).
68. Darling v. United States, 375 F.2d 843 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Hopkins v. Com-
missioner, 144 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1944); Hogle v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 66
(10th Cir. 1942).
69. Darling v. United States, 375 F.2d 843 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Mairs v. Rey-
nolds, 120 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1941).
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constituting support, except in extreme cases.70 Authority can
readily be found in local legislation or jurisprudence stating that
the extent of the obligation depends on the parents' station in
life.71
The statement in Regulation 1.662(a)-4, that the support
obligation does not include obligations affected by the adequacy
of the dependent's own resources, is probably equally applicable
to sections 677 and 678.72 This is illustrated by the fact that
the Commissioner has been unsuccessful in cases where the trust
income was paid to persons whom the grantor was only secon-
darily liable to support,78 such as adult children or parents.
Louisiana Law
Article 227 of the Civil Code is the basis of the parental
support obligation in Louisiana. It provides: "Fathers and
mothers, by the very act of marrying, contract together the
obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating their chil-
dren. ''74 This text is a literal translation from article 203 of the
Code Napoleon. Planiol, in commenting on the French article,
describes the obligation as a subsidiary one because, when the
child has resources of his own, his support should first be drawn
from those resources.75 The priority in which funds may be used
is described by Savatier as follows: the income of the minor,
70. Hill v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1937), where the court
found that it would be incredible to think that the entire trust income of
$8,200 per year was used to support and educate a ten-year old boy.
71. Mairs v. Reynolds, 120 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1941); Hill v. Commissioner,
88 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1937).
72. Most writers assume the regulation applies as well under §H 677, 678.
See Savage, Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of Support Trusts
and Uniform Gifts to Minors Statute Gifts: What Constitutes Support for
Tax Purposes, 17TH N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 729, 1112 (1959); Goodson,
When Is Payment in Discharge of Parent's Legal Obligation, 99 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 1009 (1959).
73. Commissioner v. Armour, 125 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1942).
74. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 227 (1870).
75. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE Lou-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1684 (1959): "This burden is only imposed
upon the parents because the child has no personal property, as is ordinarily
the case. When it has resources of its own, it is from its income that the
sums necessary for its upkeep should first be drawn. Its parents are not
then held except in case of the insufficiency of the child's personal income."
See also 1 P. MERLIN, REPERTOIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE 312 (5th ed. 1825). The
Spanish law, relied on by the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825,
is in accord. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS IV, tit. 19, L. 6 (transl. L. Moreau Lislet &
H. Carleton 1820): "Likewise, when the son possesses wherewith to live, or
has a trade by which he can support himself, by exercising it, in an honest
way, the father is not bound to maintain him."
[Vol. XXVIII
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the income of the parent, the capital of the minor, and finally,
the capital of the parent.76
The subsidiary nature of parental support is illustrated by
two other articles of the Louisiana Civil Code. Article 223 grants
to the parents the enjoyment or usufruct of their children's
property,77 while article 224 imposes upon them, in return for
this usufruct, the obligation to support, maintain, and educate
their children. The subsidiary nature of the obligation, thus,
is clear because the parent is granted the right to income from
the minor's property in order to aid him in supporting the
minor.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has applied this principle
in each of two cases7 8 involving an opposition by the children
to the father's accounting as natural tutor. In each case the
children had inherited substantial property from their mother
and they objected to their father's charging their support ex-
penses against the revenues from their property in his account-
ing. The court found for the father saying:
"[W]hen children have property from which a sufficient
income may be derived to provide for their subsistence and
education, the natural obligation of their father ceases, after
the dissolution of the marriage; and that then their expenses
ought to be provided for out of the revenues of their prop-
erty, pro tanto at least, if insufficient. '79
These holdings should be applicable generally to the support
obligation of the father even though the court limited its opinion
to expenses arising after the dissolution of the marriage. It has
been consistently held that the duty to support continues
76. PLANIOL ET RiPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANIAIS no 339 (2d
ed. 1952): "Parents may nevertheless charge the maintenance of their chil-
dren to the revenues of the latter, if they have any. . . . But they may not
use the capital of the children for their support unless the parents would
otherwise be required to risk loss of their own capital."
77. Gifts by parent to child were excluded from the usufruct by amend-
ment to article 226 in 1952 so that the parent could escape taxation on
the income from such gifts. See LA. CIvIL CODE art. 226 (1870), as amended,
La. Acts 1952, No. 265.
78. Succession of Fontano, 196 La. 775, 200 So. 142 (1941); Mercier v.
Canonge, 12 Rob. 385 (La. 1846).
79. Mercier v. Canonge, 12 Rob. 385, 396 (La. 1846). Same language
quoted with approval in Succession of Fontano, 196 La. 775, 792-93, 200 So.
142, 148 (1941). See also Sims v. Billington, 50 La. Ann. 968, 24 So. 637 (1898);
Newman v. Cooper, 48 La. Ann. 1206, 20 So. 722 (1896).
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throughout minority and is not extinguished by the termination
of the marriage.8 0
The same result has been reached in cases involving the
support of children after separation or divorce. The amount of
the support payment is determined by the needs of the person
requiring it and the circumstances of him who owes it.81 Based
on this formula, the courts have held that a child who obtains
employment reduces his need, and that support payments should
be lowered accordingly.8 2
The Court of Appeal, Orleans Circuit, failed to recognize
the subsidiary nature of the parents' obligation in a workmen's
compensation case in which the mother was attempting to
establish dependency on her deceased minor son. The court held
that she was dependent on his earnings because, when the son
used them for his support, he was relieving his mother of her
support obligation. However, the court rested its opinion more
on the liberal interpretation of the statute required in work-
men's compensation cases rather than on the primary support
obligation of the mother.83
There is language in some of the cases that can be cited to
negate the subsidiary nature of this obligation. The courts have
generally said that the father is primarily obligated to support
his children.A4 However, these cases may be distinguished on
their facts. They involve the usual situation where the child
has no resources of his own, and in that case, the father of course
is obligated.
As shown by the language of article 227, the obligation
to support, be it primary or secondary, extends to mothers as
well as fathers. Planiol speaks of the solidary nature of the
obligation because each of the spouses is required to contribute
80. Wilson v. Wilson, 205 La. 196, 17 So.2d 249 (1944); Lorson v. Madere,
149 La. 95, 88 So. 701 (1921); Duncan v. Duncan, 146 So.2d 255 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962); Lytell v. Lytell, 144 So.2d 925 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
81. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 231 (1870).
82. However, the court did not reduce the award in either case due to
other factors. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 167 So.2d 414 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964);
Lawrence v. Lawrence, 145 So.2d 642 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
83. Stubblefield v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 20 So.2d 430 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1945). See also Lewis v. Southern Advance Bag & Paper Co., 147
So. 532 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933); Lemmler v. Fabacher, 19 La. App. 144, 139
So. 683 (Orl. Cir. 1932).
84. Laiche v. Laiche, 237 La. 298, 111 So.2d 120 (1959); Meyers v. Bohrer,
176 So.2d 3 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Duncan v. Duncan, 146 So.2d 255 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1962); Lytell v. Lytell, 144 So.2d 925 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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to it in proportion to his or her resources.15 The courts have
recognized this and have required one spouse to bear the entire
burden when the other is insolvent, 6 or adjusted the obligation
between them in proportion to their resources.1
The duty to support under article 227 lasts throughout the
minority of the child.88 Upon attaining majority, the child has
an action for alimony under article 229 only when in necessi-
tous circumstances.8 9 The separation or divorce of the spouses and
awarding of custody to the mother does not end the father's
liability for the maintenance of his children.90 The additional
obligations of the father, due to his remarriage, cannot prej-
udice the children's rights.9 1 In fact, the support obligation
becomes a debt of the community of the second marriage and
the wages of the new wife may be garnished for its satisfaction.2
It is not clear how and to what extent emancipation of the
minor relieves his parent of the obligation of support. In cases
dealing with alimony for the wife, the courts have held that the
obligation of the husband under article 160 of the Civil Code is
superior to that of the parent under article 229. 93 Even though
these decisions dealt with majors, the same reasoning should
excuse the parent from his duty of support after emancipation
of their daughter by marriage unless her husband cannot meet
his obligation. As to emancipation of minors over eighteen by
judicial decree, the opposite result should be reached. Even
though this type of emancipation is described as relieving the
minor "from the time prescribed by law for attaining the age
85. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE Lou-
ISIANA LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1683 (1959).
86. First Natchez Bank v. Moss, 52 La. Ann. 1524, 28 So. 133 (1900); St.
Louis University v. Prudhomme, 21 La. Ann. 525 (1869).
87. Black v. Black, 205 La. 861, 18 So.2d 321 (1944); Poydras v. Poydras,
155 So.2d 221, 1 A.L.R. 317 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963); cf. Qvistgaard-Peterson
v. Qvistgaard-Peterson, 135 So.2d 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
88. Tooley v. Karcher, 196 La. 685, 200 So. 4 (1941); Wilmot v. Wilmot,
136 So.2d 806 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
89. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 229 (1870); Toller v. Karcher, 196 La. 685, 200 So. 4
(1941). LA. CIVIL CODE art. 230 (1870) limits the term of educational payments
under article 299 to the minority of the child.
90. Wilson v. Wilson, 205 La. 196, 17 So.2d 249 (1944); Hardy v. Collins,
136 La. 467, 67 So. 333 (1915); State v. Seghers, 124 La. 115, 49 So. 998 (1909).
91. Meyers v. Bohrer, 176 So.2d 3 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Duncan v.
Duncan, 146 So.2d 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); Lytell v. Lytell, 144 So.2d 925
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
92. Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So.2d 713 (1954); Lytell v. Lytell, 144
So.2d 925 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
93. Matheny v. Matheny, 205 La. 869, 18 So.2d 324 (1944); Simon v. Simon,
127 So.2d 769 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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of majority, ' '9 4 it is generally regarded as for the benefit of the
minor rather than his parents.95 The Louisiana Supreme Court
held that a judicial decree relieving the father of his duty to
support his minor child was void as contrary to the public policy
of this state.98
Article 227 of the Louisiana Civil Code is silent as to the
extent of support, maintenance, and education it requires. Article
224 provides that in return for their usufruct, the parents are
obligated "to support, to maintain and to educate their children
according to their situation in life. ' 97 However, as an inventory
of the child's assets must be recorded to obtain this usufruct,"
it is seldom in force.
While the courts have usually said that the extent of the
support obligation depends upon the means99 of the parent and
the needs of the child, 0 0 the amount of alimony required of the
parent has varied to some degree, depending upon the type of
litigation involved. In determining the amount of alimony for
children after separation or divorce, courts have always allowed
basic food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and educational ex-
penses, at least through high school.' 01 When wealthier parents
are before the court, such "luxuries" as music and dancing les-
sons 0 2 and private schools 10 3 have been awarded. In general, the
courts endeavor to maintain for the children the same standard
of care as they would have had in the father's custody.
04
College education was recognized early by the Supreme
94. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 385 (1870).
95. Id. art. 386; Comment, 20 TUL. L. REV. 574 (1946).
96. The court was dealing with a divorce decree, but its reasoning should
be equally applicable to an emancipation decree. Walder v. Walder, 159 La.
231, 105 So. 300 (1925). See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 11 (1870).
97. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 224 (1870).
98. In re Monrose, 187 La. 739, 175 So. 475 (1937).
99. Means had been interpreted to include both the assets and income of
the parent. Sanders v. Sanders, 250 La. 588, 197 So.2d 635 (1967); Moser v.
Moser, 220 La. 295, 56 So.2d 553 (1951).
100. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 231 (1870).
101. Stabler v. Stabler, 226 La. 70, 75 So.2d 12 (1954); Newton v. Newton,
196 So.2d 575 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Poydras v. Poydras, 155 So.2d 221 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1963); Harris v. Harris, 127 So.2d 747 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
102. Williams v. Barnette, 226 La. 635, 76 So.2d 912 (1954); Wilmot v.
Wilmot, 223 La. 221, 65 So.2d 321 (1953); Newton v. Newton, 196 So.2d 575
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Poydras v. Poydras, 155 So.2d 221 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963).
103. Williams v. Barnette, 226 La. 635, 76 So.2d 912 (1954); Wilmot v.
Wilmot, 223 La. 221, 65 So.2d 321 (1953); Wilson v. Wilson, 129 So.2d 61 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961).
104. Wilmot v. Wilmot, 223 La. 221, 65 So.2d 321 (1953); Wilson v. Wilson,
129 So.2d 61 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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Court as an item of support in St. Louis University v. Prud-
homme.1 5 There the University was suing parents of substantial
means for payment of the educational expenses of their son. The
court found such education a part of the support obligation. In
prosecutions for criminal neglect of family the awards are more
restrictive due to the "necessitous circumstances" requirement of
the statute. 0 6 In one case, however, expenses of a high school
education were allowed. 0 7
The lack of a clear definition of the extent of the support
obligation in the jurisprudence is due to the prohibition in Lou-
isiana law against the minor suing his parents.0 8 However, it
seems safe to conclude that the obligation of support varies
proportionately with the means of the parent in Louisiana.
Mention must also be made of the duty to support provided
by article 229. This provision requires ascendants and descen-
dants in the direct line to maintain each other when they are in
need. Since this obligation depends on the adequacy of the re-
sources of both parent1 9 and child, it is without tax affect under
Regulation 1.662 (a) -4. This applies also where both the parent
and child are destitute and the obligation is in fact due."0
CONCLUSION
The basic Louisiana law on support is by no means settled.
However, it would seem that the sounder interpretation of the
sources would be that the parent's obligation to support his
child, under article 227, is subsidiary in nature because it comes
into being only after the child's income has been exhausted.
Thus, for two reasons, the Louisiana parental support obligation
would have none of the tax effects discussed above. First, it fails
to meet the requirements of Regulation 1.662 (a)-4"' and Reve-
nue Ruling 56-484,112 since it depends on the adequacy of the
child's resources. Second, it is satisfying the child's primary ob-
ligation to support himself and, therefore, should be taxed to him.
105. 21 La. Ann. 525 (1869).
106. LA. R.S. 14:74 (1950).
107. State v. Woods, 223 La. 496, 66 So.2d 315 (1953).
108. LA. R.S. 9:571 (1950).
109. Louisiana courts have refused to hold that the obligation of the
grandparent is subsidiary to that of the parent. However, the courts have
only held the grandparent liable upon a showing that the father was desti-
tute or could not be found. See Jefferson v. Jefferson, 246 La. 1, 163 So.2d 74
(1964); Nations v. Nations, 128 So.2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956).
111. Id.
112. 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 23.
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Nevertheless, on the basis of federal tax policy, this con-
clusion is unsatisfactory. The fiscal laws should apply to resi-
dents of different states equally so far as practical, and differ-
ences in state law should not produce substantially contrary re-
sults in this important area. Such policy considerations could
convince Congress or the Commissioner to make changes in the
present statute and regulations. Such a change could be accom-
plished by the enactment of a federal support standard for tax
purposes.
The risks from indecision in this area can be substantially
reduced by the tax planner. If the transfer is made into a dis-
cretionary support trust with an independent trustee, an adverse
decision on the effect of the Louisiana support obligation would
still result in substantially lower income and estate taxes than
if the transfer had not been made.113 However, a favorable de-
cision to the taxpayer would avoid taxation to the parent and
result in another tax advantage to Louisiana residents because
of their civil law heritage.
Leon J. Reymond, Jr.
ARTIFICIAL ACCESSION TO, IMMOVABLES
Accession is the mode of acquiring ownership by the owner
of a principal thing of whatever is produced by, or incorporated
into, that principal thing.' According to the Louisiana Civil Code,
accession may be natural, brought about by forces of nature,2
or artificial, brought about by human works.3 Special rules in
the Civil Code deal with accession as applied to movables4 and
immovables. 5
This Comment is limited to a consideration of the rules
governing artificial accession to immovables, contained in articles
507 and 508 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Insofar as article 508
is concerned, discussion is largely limited to a consideration of
who may be characterized as "possessor in good faith," "land-
owner," and "third person," and to an examination of the rights
113. This assumes the usual case in which the parent is being taxed in
a higher bracket than the child.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 498, 499, 504 (1870).
2. Id. arts. 509-519.
3. Id. arts. 505-508.
4. Id. arts. 520-532.
5. Id. arts. 505-519.
[Vol. XXVIII
